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Abstract
We consider Gell-Mann and Hartle’s consistent histories formulation of quantum cos-
mology in the interpretation in which one history, chosen randomly according to the deco-
herence functional probabilities, is realised from each consistent set. We show that in this
interpretation, if one assumes that an observed quasiclassical structure will continue to be
quasiclassical, one cannot infer that it will obey the predictions of classical or Copenhagen
quantum mechanics.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Bz, 98.80.H
1. Introduction
Modern cosmological theory strongly suggests that large-scale classical structure now
dominating the universe evolved from a highly homogenous quantum state lacking any
such structure. Since this process cannot be described in the Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum theory, other interpretational ideas — requiring, or claiming to require, no
pre-existing classical realm — have attracted increasing attention over the last forty years.
There has been particular interest lately in the consistent histories approach to quantum
theory developed by Griffiths,[1, 2] Omne`s,[3, 4] and Gell-Mann and Hartle.[5, 6] Unlike
earlier suggestive but imprecise proposals in the literature, this formulation of the quantum
theory of a closed system admits a well-defined interpretation which defines an interesting
scientific theory, albeit rather a weak one. The purpose of this paper is to explain precisely
how weak this theory is when it comes to predicting the formation and evolution of classical
structure.
It was recently shown,[7] inter alia, that one cannot use any version of the consistent
histories formalism to predict that the largely classical structure we observe will persist or
appear to persist. It is shown here that if we try to evade this difficulty by simply assuming
that we will continue to observe a largely classical universe, we cannot use the consistent
histories formalism to predict that the classical equations of motion will hold, even ap-
proximately, or that the results of quantum experiments will agree with the predictions of
the Copenhagen interpretation. The formalism predicts infinitely many different possible
outcomes for a typical classical or quantum observation or experiment. The conditional
probabilities for these outcomes, given the event that classical structure persists for any
fixed time interval, are not defined.
If the aim is to derive a theory of the formation of the observed large-scale structure, or
its present dynamics, from a consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology, these
are clearly rather discouraging facts. Their implications are discussed in the concluding
section.
2. Consistent Histories
We simplify the discussion by using a version of the consistent histories formalism in
which the initial conditions are defined by a pure state rather than a density matrix, the
basic objects of the formalism are branch-dependent sets of projections, and consistency
is defined by Gell-Mann and Hartle’s decoherence criterion. Similar arguments to those
below apply in the general case.1 The notation is Gell-Mann and Hartle’s.[8]
Let ψ be the initial state of the universe. A branch-dependent set of histories is a set
of products of projection operators chosen from projective decompositions and with a time
label. The set is indexed by the variable α = {αn, αn−1, . . . , α1}, where the ranges of the
αk and the projections they define depend on the values of αk−1, . . . , α1, and the histories
take the form:
Cα = P
n
αn
(tn;αn−1, . . . , α1)P
n−1
αn−1
(tn−1;αn−2, . . . , α1) . . . P
1
α1
(t1) . (2.1)
Here, for fixed values of αk−1, . . . , α1, the P
k
αk
(tk;αk−1, . . . , α1) define a projective decom-
position indexed by αk, so that
∑
αk
P kαk(tk;αk−1, . . . , α1) = 1 and
P kαk(tk;αk−1, . . . , α1)P
k
α′
k
(tk;αk−1, . . . , α1) = δαkα′k P
k
αk
(tk;αk−1, . . . , α1) . (2.2)
1 In particular, if there is an impure initial density matrix, then the discussion of Ref. [7],
Section 3, can be used to show that a generic quasiclassical history belongs to an infinite family of
inequivalent consistent sets. The use of branch-dependent sets, though convenient for discussing
structure formation, is also inessential.
The set of histories is consistent if and only if
(Cβψ , Cαψ ) = δαβ p(α) , (2.3)
in which case p(α) is interpreted as the probability of the history Cα.
2 The histories of
non-zero probability in a consistent set thus correspond precisely to the non-zero vectors
Cαψ. Only consistent sets are of physical relevance. Although the dynamics are defined
purely by the hamiltonian, with no collapse postulate, each projection in the history can
be thought of as corresponding to a historical event, taking place at the relevant time.
If a given history is realised, its events correspond to extra physical information, neither
deducible from the state vector nor influencing it.
Most projection operators involve rather obscure physical quantities, so that it is
hard to interpret a general history in familiar language. Given some sensible model, with
hamiltonian and canonical variables specified, one can construct sets of histories which
describe familiar physics and check that they are indeed consistent. For example, a useful
set of histories for describing the solar system could be defined by projection operators
whose non-zero eigenspace contains states in which a given planet’s centre of mass is located
in a suitably chosen small volumes of space at the relevant times, and one would expect
a sensible model to show that this is a consistent set and that the histories of significant
probability are those agreeing with the trajectories predicted by general relativity. More
generally, Gell-Mann and Hartle[5] introduce the notion of a quasiclassical domain: a
consistent set which is complete — in the sense that it cannot be consistently extended
by more projective decompositions — and is defined by projection operators which involve
similar variables at different times and which satisfy classical equations of motion, to a
very good approximation, most of the time. The notion of a quasiclassical domain seems
natural, though presently imprecisely defined. Its heuristic definition is motivated by
the familiar example of the hydrodynamic variables — densities of chemical species in
small volumes of space, and similar quantities — which characterise our own quasiclassical
domain. Here the branch-dependence of the formalism plays an important role, since the
precise choice of variables (most obviously, the sizes of the small volumes) we use depends
on earlier historical events. The formation of our galaxy and solar system influences all
subsequent local physics; even present-day quantum experiments have the potential to do
2 Note that, when we use the compact notation Cα to refer to a history, we intend the individual
projection operators, not just their product, to be part of the definition of the history.
so significantly, if we arrange for large macroscopic events to depend on their results. It
should be stressed at this point that, according to all the developers of the consistent
histories approach, quasiclassicality and related properties are interesting notions to study
within, not defining features of, the formalism. All consistent sets of histories have the
same physical status.
By an interpretation of the consistent histories formalism we mean a description of
physics which uses only basic mathematical quantities defined in the formalism, such as
sets and histories, and which respects the democracy among consistent sets. The literature
contains a variety of such interpretations, but essentially these are different ways of saying
the same thing. One can, with Griffiths, say that precisely one history from each consistent
set is realised, these histories being chosen according to the probability distribution defined
on their set. One can, more economically, say that in fact only one consistent set is
physically relevant, but that we have no theoretical rule which identifies this set or its
properties.[7] Or one can, as Gell-Mann and Hartle do, say that the predictions one makes
depend on the set one uses — though here it must be understood that for almost all sets
these predictions will not correspond to the physics one actually observes. In each case,
though, it is to be understood that we can only observe events from one history, and that
the formalism supplies no theoretical criterion characterising the consistent set from which
that history is drawn. These forms of words are scientifically equivalent. When we come
to predicting the future from historical data, our predictions all take the form “if S turns
out to be the relevant consistent set, then event E will take place with probability p”. No
event can be predicted independent of the as yet unknown set S, and in fact any prediction
made in a generic consistent set S will be incompatible with the predictions made in some
other consistent set S′.3 We will use the many-histories language here. Nature consists of
a list of histories H(S) drawn from each consistent set S. No observer can observe events
from more than one such history. The formalism predicts neither the history H(S) in
which we find ourselves nor the set S to which it belongs. It supplies only the probabilities
for the possible H(S) given the unknown set S.
I should like to add here the cautionary remark that there is another interpretation of
the consistent histories formalism which is not equivalent to the many-histories interpre-
tation considered here.4 This interpretation, which as I understand it is not advocated by
3 These points are discussed in detail in Ref. [7]. The reader might also find the shorter
summaries in Refs. [9, 10] useful.
4 I am very grateful to Todd Brun for pointing this out in the course of an illuminating
correspondence.
Griffiths, Omne`s, or Gell-Mann & Hartle (but see Saunders[11]), can be summarised by
saying that every consistent history is realised in a continuum of copies whose measure is
given by the history’s probability weight.5
3. Quasiclassical Histories in Quantum Cosmology
In the absence of a quantum theory of gravity, we work in some fixed background
spacetime with preferred timelike directions and suppose that the gravitational interac-
tions of matter can be modelled by a non-covariant quantum potential. This is obviously
incorrect, but at least shares qualitative features with the type of description that it is
hoped might emerge from a fundamental theory.
A semi-classical treatment, in which the background manifold depends on the large-
scale structures in the matter distribution described by the different branches, would pre-
sumably give a better description of our quasiclassical domain. But it is hard to see any
useful role for a consistency criterion in a semi-classical theory, and in any case no adequate
semi-classical theory is available. Gell-Mann and Hartle’s definition of a quasiclassical do-
main has to be understood as a definition which applies to real world cosmology only in
the context of a theory of gravity yet to be developed.6
What can be said about cosmology in our model? No consistent set can give the
correct account of the evolution of large-scale structure, since there is no definitive account
of the unobserved past in the consistent histories formalism. However, cosmologically
minded consistent historians envisage that the set defining our quasiclassical domain can
be extended to a set — there may well be many such sets, but let us fix on one and call it
S0 — which gives a particularly interesting account, running very roughly as follows.
Some projective decomposition P 1α1 at an early time t1 characterises inhomogeneities
which mark the beginning of the formation of structure. Further decompositions
P 2α2 , . . . , P
k
αk
, which depend on the inhomogeneities already realised, describe the devel-
opment of greater and finer-grained inhomogeneity. By some later time, say tk+1, almost
all of the projections in these decompositions become, to a very good approximation,
5 Though the separate discussion necessary for this interpretation is beyond the scope of this
paper, it seems to me that the interpretation suffers from related and equally severe problems.
6 A discussion of possible generalisations of the formalism to quantum gravity can be found in
Ref. [12].
projections onto ranges of eigenvalues for hydrodynamic variables. At this point the his-
tories of non-zero probability define many distinct branches of the quasiclassical domain,
each of which corresponds to the formation of significantly different large-scale structures.
This branching process continues through to the present, through processes such as the
quantum spreading of macroscopic bodies and those of their interactions with microscopic
particles or subsystems that are subsequently macroscopically amplified. Each probabilis-
tic quantum experiment that we perform, for example, defines a new branching. There
are thus, by now, a very large number of non-zero history vectors Cα ψ corresponding to
distinct quasiclassical branches. The quasiclassical domain is filled out, between all these
branchings, by many projective decompositions describing events which are very nearly
predictable from the earlier history.
The branching process must stop at some point if the Hilbert space is finite-
dimensional, since all the non-zero history vectors are orthogonal and any new branching
adds to their number.[7, 9] The familiar description of quantum experiments cannot be
reproduced beyond this point, since all subsequent events are predictable. Indeed, it is
not clear that the quasiclassical domain can continue at all. Consistent historians thus
generally tacitly assume that the Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional, or at least that the
present number of branches is very much smaller than its dimension. In order to simplify
the discussion we will do so too.
Although Gell-Mann and Hartle generally refer to quasiclassicality as a property of
domains, it is obviously sensible and useful to refer to individual histories as being qua-
siclassical if they are built from projectors defined by hydrodynamic variables and if the
conditional probabilities of most of these projectors, given the earlier history, is very close
to one. The picture S0 gives, then, is of a large number of histories Cα , including our
own history Cα0 , defined up to the present time t0 , almost all of which are quasiclassical
in their later stages. Any quantum experiments we now undertake can be described by a
consistent set S′0 which extends S0 by projections, defined for the branch of S0 corre-
sponding to our own history, which (very nearly) describe future hydrodynamic variables
— the local densities around the possible paths of a pointer, say — that record the results.
The possible outcomes of these experiments are described by a series of non-zero history
vectors Pβ1 Cα0ψ, . . . , Pβk Cα0ψ . Each of these outcomes corresponds to a quasiclassical
history, which we take to be complete up to time t > t0 . Let us suppose we are just about
to undertake such an experiment, and for simplicity suppose that the number of outcomes,
k, is three or larger.
Now consider a similar branching, corresponding to another quantum process with
several macroscopically distinct outcomes, described by vectors Pγ1 Cαψ, . . . , Pγl Cαψ in
a history Cαψ other than our own. These histories can be described in the equivalent
consistent set in which the projective decomposition defined by the Pγi is replaced by that
defined by the one-dimensional projectors P ′γi onto the states Pγi Cαψ , together with their
complement (1 −
∑
i P
′
γi
) , which defines the zero probability history (1 −
∑
i P
′
γi
)Cαψ.
Although there are (l + 1) projectors in this decomposition, there are still only l physical
branches, since zero probability histories are physically irrelevant in the formalism. We can
define other consistent sets, which are inequivalent to S0 and involve non-quasiclassical
histories in the branches extending the history Cαψ , by replacing the projectors P
′
γi
in
this last decomposition by projectors onto any l states forming an orthogonal basis for the
subspace spanned by the vectors Pγi Cαψ .
By making similar substitutions of the projective decompositions on all branches other
than our own, we can construct an infinite number of consistent sets S whose only quasi-
classical history is our own, Cα0 . After the branching defined, in any of these sets, by the
experiment we are about to undertake, the only quasiclassical histories will be the Pβi Cα0 ,
corresponding to the k possible experimental results. Finally, we can pick one result, i0,
and again define new consistent sets by replacing the projectors Pβi for i 6= i0 by projec-
tors onto another orthonormal basis of the subspace spanned by {Pβi Cα0 : i 6= i0}. In
this way we can construct an infinite number of consistent sets S which include precisely
one of the histories Pβi0 Cα0 , which extend the history Cα0 non-quasiclassically between
times t0 and t in all the other (k − 1) branches, and which have no other quasiclassical
histories. These sets do not correspond to quasiclassical domains, but contain one qua-
siclassical branch, which describes our history to date together with one of the possible
outcomes of the experiments we are about to undertake.7
The probabilities of the histories Pβi Cα0 are non-zero. Now, according to the many-
histories interpretation, one history is realised from each of the sets S , and the probability
of being realised from any given set is simply the standard history probability. Since we
have seen that there are an infinite number of consistent sets containing any of these histo-
ries, it follows with probability one that each of these k histories is realised infinitely many
7 Though sets of histories of this type do not seem to have been explicitly considered in the
literature, most consistent historians would, I believe, take their existence for granted in any
sensible cosmological model.
times from sets S of the form described above. That is, each of the quasiclassical histories
defined by all of our observed data to date, together with one of the possible experimental
results, is realised infinitely many times. The consistent histories formalism, in the many-
histories interpretation, realises an infinite number of copies of each possible quasiclassical
outcome, and these copies of course include descriptions of ourselves observing our history
and the outcome of the experiment.
This is the problem. The formalism supplies us neither with any way of identifying
the correct set from which to draw our history, nor with any probability measure on the
sets. Thus, though we can identify the history describing the data we observe, and though,
when given a particular consistent set, we can calculate the probabilities of its histories, we
have no way to compute theoretically, or from empirical data, the probability of belonging
to a history realised from any given set or class of sets. If we merely adopt the assumption
that our realised history up to time t will be quasiclassical, we can make no probabilistic
predictions. In order to do so, we need to make a stronger assumption — for example,
that our history will be one realised from a particular set. To make such an assumption is
to go beyond the formalism.
The discussion applies a fortiori to the predictions of classical mechanics since, of
course, these predictions are never made with complete certainty. The argument just
outlined holds so long as the probabilities are non-zero, and there is always some tiny
probability that the position of a macroscopic object will undergo a significant quantum
fluctuation without violating the quasiclassicality of its history. While the classical equa-
tions of motion are supposed to hold to a very good approximation, nearly all of the time,
in a quasiclassical domain, a macroscopic tunnelling event need not violate these criteria.
For example, if we study a ball thrown against a wall, a very nearly consistent8 set can be
defined by projection operators whose eigenspaces correspond to states in which the ball’s
centre of mass lies within small volumes of space on either side of the wall, and the history
in which the ball’s centre of mass trajectory goes towards the wall and then continues on
the far side is a quasiclassical history whose probability, though tiny, is non-zero.
It might possibly be argued against this last point that it is sensible to ignore very
small probability histories in the formalism. There are several problems with this line of
8 Gell-Mann and Hartle require only approximately consistent sets.[5] However, it is
conjectured[7] that this set can be approximated by an exactly consistent set which describes
essentially the same physics. The conjecture is investigated further in Ref. [13].
defence, however. It is true that, as Gell-Mann and Hartle point out,[5] it is often sensible
and convenient to ignore small probability histories. If, for example, we have found a
good theoretical reason to fix a particular set of histories for making predictions, and find
that within that set the probability of the sun failing to rise tomorrow is 10−10
40
, we can
for all practical purposes take it to be zero. But this does not imply (and Gell-Mann and
Hartle do not argue) that small probability histories are meaningless or always theoretically
negligible. In particular, small probability histories can still give rise to large conditional
probabilities. The construction above produces infinitely many consistent sets in which the
only quasiclassical history is one in which the sun fails to rise and of course, in those sets,
the probability of no sunrise conditioned on persisting quasiclassicality is, tautologically,
one.
It is true that we could simply declare by fiat that all histories with probability smaller
than some parameter ǫ are to be neglected. Some care would be required here, since the
probability of our own realised history, ǫ0, is by now extremely small, and ǫ/ǫ0 would also
have to be very small if we are to continue observing random events for very long. But
in any case this strategy would mean that ǫ/ǫ0 becomes a key parameter in determining
the outcome of experiments. No outcome i whose probability conditioned on the past
history, p(i|H), is smaller than ǫ/ǫ0 could arise. However, we would still have no way
of deriving from the many-histories interpretation the correct probabilities, conditioned
on future quasiclassicality, for outcomes for which p(i|H) > ǫ/ǫ0. Many predictions of
classical mechanics might, for some finite time interval, be recovered by this strategy
— at the price of introducing a new experimentally determinable parameter — but the
predictions of Copenhagen quantum mechanics cannot be.
Finally, it should be stressed that the problem identified here is quite different from the
generally recognised problems of precisely defining quasiclassicality[5] and of understanding
the error limits within which classical physics can be recovered once a set involving classical
variables has been specified.[3,4] The arguments here require only a heuristic definition of
quasiclassicality,[5] but of course would remain valid if a precise definition were supplied.
4. Conclusions
The argument we have given is very simple. Predictions within the formalism depend
on one’s choice of set. If we choose one of the infinitely many sets whose only quasiclassical
history describes a series of N measurements of σx on spin-1 particles prepared in the
eigenstate σy = 1 , in each of which σx = 1 is observed, then our prediction is that
either quasiclassicality will fail to persist or that σx = 1 will repeatedly be observed. If
we condition on the persistence of quasiclassicality, then in this set the latter prediction is
made with probability one. And indeed, this sequence of results is realised in an infinite
number of sets, as are all other sequences. Without a measure on the space of sets, we
cannot assign any a priori probability distribution to the choice of set which should be
used for prediction, and hence — if we assume the persistence of quasiclassicality — cannot
assign any probabilities to our quasiclassical predictions.
Is the conclusion interesting? Why should anyone have hoped to calculate conditional
probabilities of the type considered? Might the conclusion perhaps rely on a perverse read-
ing of the consistent histories formalism? Can we not easily find another interpretation in
which no similar difficulty arises? Is there perhaps a natural measure on the consistent sets
which produces the correct probabilistic predictions? If not, is there a simple amendment
to the formalism which does the job? We take these points in turn.
At issue here is the relation between the consistent histories formulation of quantum
cosmology, classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics. Nothing that the
consistent histories formalism says is inconsistent with either of these last two theories. It
does not contradict their predictions. However, it does not allow us to derive them. Given
any quasiclassical history, such as the one we find ourselves in, the formalism makes no
probabilistic or deterministic predictions of future events. As we have seen, this still holds
true if we assume that the history will continue to be quasiclassical. The predictions of
Copenhagen quantum mechanics do not follow even from the consistent histories account
of quantum cosmology combined with the assumption of a quasiclassical history obeying
standard classical mechanics to a good approximation. All three theories are independent.
Gell-Mann and Hartle argue[5] that, although all consistent sets are equivalent in the
formalism, we find ourselves perceiving a quasiclassical history because we have evolved so
as to become sensitive to quasiclassical variables and adapted to make use of them. There
are implicit assumptions in this argument which need not concern us here.[7] Let us accept
that it might be so, and suppose that some theory of perception tells us that for the pur-
pose of predicting our own future perceptions we can ignore the possibility that we might
find ourselves in a non-quasiclassical history. The preceding discussion still tells us that
there are infinitely many observers sharing our evolutionary history, continuing to observe
a quasiclassical world in the future, who find their subsequent observations disagreeing
with classical mechanics and Copenhagen quantum mechanics. This in itself need not be
an insuperable problem; however, the formalism does not define any probability measure
that allows us to tell which type of realised quasiclassical history is more probable. Thus,
accepting Gell-Mann and Hartle’s argument, we find ourselves unable to use the consis-
tent histories formalism to make the predictions of classical mechanics and Copenhagen
quantum mechanics.
We need not interpret the formalism in many-histories language. The other interpre-
tations of the formalism in the literature, though, have the same implication when it comes
to making predictions, and it is easy to see why without rehearsing the full argument[7] for
their equivalence. To predict anything, in any interpretation, we require data, in the form
of the observed history H , and a consistent set S which includes the projections defining
that history. Neither the inclusion of the projections defining H , nor the assumption that
S contains quasiclassical histories extending H , are very strong constraints on S . With-
out assuming some sort of probability measure on the space of sets we cannot characterise
the likely properties of S . In particular we cannot say what type of histories it is likely
to contain, or which quasiclassical histories it is likely to contain.
There is, indeed, a natural measure on the consistent sets of histories, defined at least
if the Hilbert space is finite-dimensional, and inherited from the geometric description of
consistent sets as algebraic curves.[7] Unfortunately, though unsurprisingly, when restricted
to the class of sets containing extensions of a given quasiclassical history, it assigns measure
zero to the subclass containing quasiclassical extensions of that history. In other words,
if the formalism is amended so that the physically relevant set is chosen according to the
natural measure, it predicts with probability one that the quasiclassicality we observe will
cease immediately.
The obvious amendment to the formalism is to abandon democracy amongst consis-
tent sets. If we hypothesise that a set defining our quasiclassical domain is the physically
relevant set, or more generally that among the physically relevant sets it is the only one
including some the projections which characterise the observed data, then we can cer-
tainly predict the persistence of quasiclassicality and derive the predictions of classical and
Copenhagen quantum mechanics.9 In practice this is almost precisely what we do when
we make experimentally testable predictions: we do not typically use all the projections
defining our quasiclassical domain, but the variables we do consider are always quasiclassi-
cal projections or operators almost perfectly correlated with those projections. To suppose
9 Another possible strategy, though one fraught with problems, is the selection of sets which
characterise observers rather than domains.[7]
that a particular set or type of set is fundamentally preferred, of course, is to go beyond
orthodox quantum theory, by insisting that particular variables are distinguished. How-
ever, it appears to be necessary in order to derive our most successful physical theories
from the consistent histories formulation of quantum cosmology.
There are at least two genuine, and genuinely new, interpretations of quantum theory
which follow the line of thought that begins with the arguments of Everett et al.[14] that
quantum theory admits a “many-worlds interpretation”. One of these, due to Bell,[15,
16] abandons the notion of a coherent historical description of physics entirely: the events
occurring at any time are uncorrelated with those at earlier or later times. This proposal is
logically consistent and, given the correct dynamics and boundary conditions, experimen-
tally unfalsifiable, but is not thought by most physicists (and was not thought by Bell) to
be a useful scientific theory, since it makes cosmology redundant, memory fictitious, and
useful prediction impossible. The other is the interpretation based on the consistent histo-
ries formalism considered here. Neither allows the derivation of a theory of quasiclassical
physics.
This is not to say that either the formalism itself or the current ideas about structure
formation are misguided. The former suggests at least one possible way of going beyond
orthodox quantum theory. The latter implicitly rely on intuitions, which may well be
sound, about the variables which might be distinguished. It would seem, though, that
if we want a genuine derivation of a theory of the formation and dynamics of the qua-
siclassical structure in the universe from quantum cosmology, in which we can make the
usual quasiclassical predictions, then we have to go beyond orthodox quantum theory as
it is presently understood by identifying preferred variables in some way. This need not
necessarily involve any change in the dynamics.
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